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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City, 
University of London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue 
focussed leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other 
key market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into 
the world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from 
financing to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
here has recently been a flurry of 
academic literature concerned with 
activist investors and their influence 
(benign or otherwise) on decisions made by 
targeted companies. But what about the 
‘silent majority’, those fund managers who 
invest without taking an activist stance? Do 
they get what they want from the company? 
Specifically, do they get the dividend policy 
they want?   
This is very difficult to study directly. 
Institutional holdings normally change 
gradually and so will each institution’s 
influence. This makes it hard to match 
institutional desires with any changes in 
dividend policy. And in the static case, 
observing a company and seeing if its 
payout policy matches the needs of its 
current shareholders requires one to judge if 
a payout policy is particularly generous or 
not, in the context of the industry, and then 
placing a judgement on each institution’s 
wants or needs, an almost impossible 
exercise. 
The dividend / M&A link 
What we need is an event, a before and 
after point, when we can look for changes in 
dividend policy before and after the event, 
and similarly with the shareholder base, also 
before and after the event. Then we 
effectively have a controlled experiment 
where we can see if there are changes in 
dividend policy to reflect the desires of the 
new shareholding base. Fortunately, we 
have such an event, an event where 
dividend policy often changes and where 
there is an engineered change in the 
shareholder base: an equity-financed 
acquisition. 
In this report we show that firms actively 
manage their dividend policy towards the 
preferences of their investors. We use a 
novel setting, namely, merger-induced 
changes in the shareholder base, in order to 
establish this effect. Acquiring firms adjust 
their dividend policy towards that of the 
target when they inherit target firm 
shareholders through a stock-swap 
transaction. These catering activities are 
more pronounced when the target 
represents a larger part of the combined firm 
and when dividends are tax-advantaged.  
Interestingly but not surprisingly, adjustment 
towards the pre-merger dividend policy of 
the target is lower when the acquirer comes 
from a better governance regime. Our 
analysis also shows that acquirers are less 
likely to pay for the target company in the 
form of stock when the target pays higher 
dividends than the acquirer. Finally, we 
show that mergers overall have a negative 
impact on the combined firm payout: 
merging firms reduce dividends and are less 
likely to be dividend payers after the deal 
relative to firms that do not merge.  
Implications 
These findings imply something else to think 
about if you are a shareholder of a serial 
acquirer. That firm you bought into years 
ago is not only not going to be static in terms 
of business mix but the regular payouts you 
receive may well change as well. And if you 
are a shareholder on the target company 
side, you don’t necessarily have to sell the 
received stock payment after the deal, as 
you can stick around (together with other 
shareholders) and make the new entity fit 
your needs more closely. And finally, if you 
are a shareholder of one of these acquirers 
who is wary of stock issuance, you should 
probably steer the company towards targets 
with attractive yields.  
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What we knew about dividend payouts
hy do firms pay dividends? This 
question has attracted significant 
academic attention following the 
publication in 1961 of the seminal Miller and 
Modigliani “dividend irrelevance” proposition. 
According to their theory, in the absence of 
capital market imperfections, investors should 
be indifferent between a dollar in dividends 
and a dollar in capital gains. An important 
capital market imperfection that gives rise to 
the potential relevance of dividend policy for 
firm value is taxation. If dividends are taxed at 
lower rates compared to capital gains, or not at 
all as is the case for certain investor groups in 
many jurisdictions, then dividend policy 
becomes an important consideration for the 
firm. Similar effects may arise if investors are 
subject to behavioural biases, for example, 
viewing dividend and capital gains differently in 
their mental accounts. A firm would pay 
dividends when its investors prefer dividend 
income and would refrain from paying 
dividends when its investors prefer capital 
gains (that also may be tax driven). This 
argument is known as the “dividend clientele” 
effect. 
Is there a dividend clientele effect? 
There is, however, limited evidence on the 
importance of such dividend clienteles. 
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence on 
the existence of a dividend clientele effect. 
And if they do exist, it is not clear whether 
investors preferring dividends simply choose to 
invest in dividend-paying stocks or whether 
firms actually cater to their investors. Some 
studies show that the level of dividend payout 
does not exert a significant influence on 
portfolio selection decisions. However, others 
document that retail investors’ stock holdings 
are characterised by a preference for 
dividends that decreases with income and 
increases with age.1 
                                                          
1 As an example, see Graham, J. and Kumar, A., Journal of 
Finance, 2006 
One study examines the effects of the 
concentration of institutional investors on 
companies’ dividend behaviour. 2  They show 
that institutional investors have a preference 
for dividend paying stocks, however among 
these stocks they prefer those that pay lower 
dividends. They also find that a high 
concentration of institutional shareholders 
does not result in companies paying higher 
dividends. In their survey analysis of 
companies’ dividend policies, others provide 
evidence that institutional investors are not 
characterised by a distinct preference for 
dividends over share repurchases.3 Thus the 
research doesn’t provide a clear picture…yet. 
Mixed messages about institutional 
behaviour 
One study from 1995 investigated the change 
in institutional ownership following dividend 
omissions and found no evidence of significant 
shifts in ownership structure. 4  In contrast, 
other studies suggest that companies’ 
institutional investor clientele adjusts according 
to its tax preferences following dividend 
initiations, with a significant shift in ownership 
towards tax-deferred/tax-exempt and 
corporate institutions.5  
Several more recent studies identify the 
presence of dividend clienteles that are not 
based on tax preferences, for example, 
demonstrating that retail (as opposed to 
institutional) investors can display a preference 
for investing in local companies while older 
investors are more likely to invest in 
companies which pay high dividends. 6  The 
authors suggest that the combined effect of 
these two distinct preferences results in 
geographically varying demand for dividends.  
                                                          
2 Grinstein, Y. and Michaely, R., Journal of Finance, 2005 
3 As an example, see Brav, A et al, Financial Management, 2008 
4 Michaely, R., Thaler, R. and Womack, K., Journal of Finance, 
1995 
5 As an example, see Dhaliwal, Erickson and Trezevant, National 
Tax Journal, 1999 
6 As an example, see Becker, Ivkovic and Weisbenner, Journal 
of Finance, 2011 
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We focus here in this study on shareholders 
“inherited” through merger transactions based 
on differences in the demand for dividends. 
Our research builds on earlier studies by 
investigating whether a substantial shift in the 
dividend clientele of a firm resulting from 
changes in the shareholder base due to a 
stock swap merger leads to changes in the 
dividend policy. This setting allows us to 
capture differences in the preference for 
dividends across different investors in a more 
direct way, without the need to make 
underlying assumptions about the likely 
preferences of these different investor groups 
(e.g., as in the earlier studies above, 
assumptions about the preferences of retail, 
institutional or older investors). Finally, this 
setting allows us to demonstrate that firms 
actively cater to their investors and alter their 
dividend policy to accommodate shareholder 
preferences, rather than different dividend 
clienteles simply selecting into firms with 
compatible dividend policies. 
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Our questions and our approach 
e set out to tackle the following four 
questions: 
 
1. Do firms actively set dividend 
policies to please investors? 
2. When do policies change the 
most? 
3. Before making an acquisition, will 
bidders be put off by differences 
in dividend policy? 
4. More generally, what is the effect 
of M&A on the propensity to pay 
dividends? 
The ‘investor preference’ question 
In a stock-swap merger, the acquirer inherits 
the shareholders of the target firm. If the pre-
merger dividend policies of the two firms are 
different, the newly-acquired dividend-seeking 
shareholders (called here, ‘dividend clientele’) 
may compel the acquirer to adjust its dividend 
level payout towards that of the target’s. To the 
extent that acquisitions have an impact on the 
firms’ dividend policy, cash-financed 
acquisitions provide a natural control group, 
since they do not entail a change in the 
shareholder base. 
Our main outcome variable of interest is the 
change in the acquirer’s dividend policy from 
before to after the deal. We measure the 
change in acquirer’s dividends per share 
(DPS) over periods starting one year before 
and ending one, two and three years following 
the completion of the M&A deal. 
To capture the difference in dividend 
preferences of the shareholders of the acquirer 
and the target prior to the acquisition we define 
a Dividend Gap variable (DPS and Dividend 
Gap are described more fully in the Appendix), 
which is equal to the ratio of target to acquirer 
dividend yields.  
To further isolate the clientele effect from 
alternative explanations, we control for other 
potential determinants of the change in the 
dividend policy of the merged firm. (We show 
below two particularly significant ones and six 
others are detailed in the Appendix). 
 To control for the implications of the 
signalling theory of dividends which 
states that companies signal their 
future improved prospects by raising 
dividend payout rates, we adopt a 
measure of the change in expected 
future earnings of the acquiring firm as 
a consequence of the acquisition. We 
use the change in expected/forecasted 
EPS measured over a period starting 
one year before and ending one year 
after the deal completion to capture 
the change in expected acquirer 
earnings, or synergies. 
 
 The life cycle view of dividends 
suggests that a company begins to 
distribute funds to shareholders when 
its profitability and growth are 
diminishing. This is diametrically 
opposed to the predictions of the 
signalling theory. To control for the 
implications of the life cycle view of 
dividends, we measure the change in 
acquirer growth opportunities in the 
period surrounding the completion of 
the M&A deal. Specifically, growth 
opportunities are measured using the 
market to book ratio of the acquirer. 
The ‘drivers’ question 
In order to tackle the second question, we 
consider governance, tax and relative size as 
potential drivers of dividend policy change. 
We therefore test whether acquirers are less 
likely to cater to the newly-acquired dividend 
clientele when the acquirer comes from a 
superior governance regime, where the need 
for dividends as a pre-commitment device is 
lower. To implement this test we take 
advantage of cross-border deals in our sample 
and measure the difference in the quality of 
W 
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corporate governance in acquirer and target 
countries using an anti-self-dealing index. 7 
Higher values of the index indicate better 
governance quality, and therefore higher 
values of the difference between the acquirer 
and the target country’s index are associated 
with greater improvements in the degree of 
protection afforded to target shareholders who 
receive acquiring firm shares as payment. 
Our second test exploits cross-country 
differences in dividend tax regimes. If dividend 
clienteles are tax-related, one would expect 
that the incentives to cater to newly-acquired 
dividend clienteles increases with the tax 
advantage. To capture cross-sectional 
differences in the degree of dividend tax 
advantage, we classify countries into three 
different tax systems depending on the 
corporation tax rate and dividend tax credit:8  
 Full Imputation - where investors pay 
personal taxes on distributed earnings 
but receive full tax credit for the 
corporate taxes paid on these 
earnings 
 
 Partial Imputation - where investors 
pay personal taxes on distributed 
earnings but receive partial tax credit 
for the corporate taxes paid on these 
earnings 
 
 Classical - where investors pay 
personal taxes on distributed earnings 
in addition to the corporate taxes paid 
on these earnings 
Finally, the incentives to cater to newly-
acquired dividend clienteles should be greater 
when this new clientele represents a larger 
fraction of the merged firm. We therefore test 
whether the policy change effect is further 
increased in deals where the target is large 
relative to the acquirer.  
                                                          
7 Dyankov, S et al, Journal of Financial Economics, 2008 
8 Alzahrani, M. and Lasfer, M., Journal of Corporate Finance, 2012 
The ‘could a dividend policy put you 
off’ question 
Another way in which dividend policies may 
impact M&A deals is the payment method 
choice. Specifically, the acquirer may choose 
to avoid inheriting the target’s shareholders 
when the dividend policy of the target is 
sufficiently different (more generous) to that of 
the acquirer such that satisfying the new 
clientele is prohibitively costly. This can be 
achieved by making a pure cash offer as 
opposed to an offer containing equity as part 
of the consideration. We therefore test for the 
existence of this effect by investigating 
whether differences in the dividend policy of 
the merging firms (as captured by the Dividend 
Gap variable) influence the payment method 
choice. 
The ‘big picture’ question 
We further use our sample to examine another 
unexplored question regarding dividend policy 
and M&A. We are interested in whether 
mergers have an abnormally positive or 
negative effect on total dividend payout for a 
shareholder holding both acquirer and target 
stock.  
To that end, we consider yearly observations 
on dividends paid by both the acquirer and 
target in the year prior to the deal and by the 
combined firm in each of the three years 
following the deal. 
 
 
 
 8 
 
© Cass Business School May 2018 
 
Our findings
n the regression analysis we found that: 
 
Firms adjust dividend policy towards 
that of the target only if there is an 
exchange of equity, which implies that 
firms do set dividend policies to please 
investors 
The results show that acquirer DPS increase 
by 20.6% one year following the merger when 
the target used to pay higher dividends, while 
this increase is only 19.4% when the target 
paid either equal or a lower amount of 
dividends than the acquirer. The difference 
between the two figures is 1.2% but is not 
statistically significant. The same pattern is 
observed for years two and three following the 
deal. We would expect that any policy change 
effect comes primarily from deals containing 
some stock as the method of payment 
whereby the acquirer inherits some of the 
target’s shareholders and experiences a shift 
in its dividend clientele. 
As predicted, we observe that the magnitude 
of the adjustment of the acquirer’s dividend 
payout towards that of the target is 
considerably higher (and significant) when the 
method of payment includes some stock. 
Specifically, for deals containing some stock 
as consideration, the difference in acquirer 
dividends per share between cases where the 
target pays higher dividends than the acquirer 
versus cases of equal or lower target payout is 
5.5%, 9.3%, and 11.7% for years one, two, 
and three following the deal, respectively. In 
contrast, the corresponding differences in the 
case of cash deals are actually negative. Note 
that if we include acquirers that pay no 
dividend we get the same directional results, 
only with slightly less significance. 
Eliminating other explanations 
Next, we conducted tests which allowed us to 
fully utilize the variation in the dividend gap 
and percentage stock paid as well as to control 
for other potential explanations of the change 
in acquirer dividend payout following the deal. 
We did find support (although weak) for our 
expectation that acquirers adjust their dividend 
policy towards that of the target. This effect, 
however, is entirely due to cases where the 
payment method includes stock. The greater 
the change in the dividend clientele of the 
acquirer, the greater the change in its post-
acquisition dividend policy. In other words, the 
acquirer is more likely to increase dividend 
payments following a deal when the target’s 
dividend clientele was accustomed to receiving 
higher dividend payments than the acquirer 
before the completion of the deal.  
There are certain factors that can 
imply larger changes in dividend policy 
Our results support the idea that dividend 
payments are a governance tool and that there 
is less need to pay dividends in countries with 
strong investor protection, reducing the 
incentives to cater to newly-acquired dividend 
clienteles when governance quality afforded to 
those new clienteles is improved. We find that 
when the acquirer company is domiciled in a 
country with relatively stronger investor 
protection to that of the target’s country of 
domicile, the clientele effect is reduced. 
Consistent with our predictions, we also find 
that acquirers are more likely to cater to their 
newly acquired dividend clientele following 
acquisitions in countries with full or partial 
imputation systems, i.e. when the tax cost 
associated with dividends is relatively lower. 
Finally, the results confirm our intuition that the 
acquirer is more likely to accommodate 
preferences of target shareholders inherited 
through a stock swap when the target 
company is large relative to the bidder. 
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Differences in dividend policy 
discourage the use of stock in a deal 
Results confirm our conjecture from question 
three. When acquirers are unwilling or expect 
to be unable to adjust their dividend policy 
towards that of the target, they are less likely 
to structure the deal as a pure stock swap.  
M&A reduces the propensity to pay 
dividends 
Our analysis shows that mergers are 
associated with a 16.1% reduction in the 
combined firm dividend payout relative to other 
merging firms that have not yet merged. It 
appears that mergers, on average, lead to a 
decline in dividend payments. Mergers are 
associated with a 4.0% reduction in the 
propensity of the combined firm to be a 
dividend payer. These results are interesting 
for at least two reasons. First, they 
complement the literature on the effects of 
mergers on shareholders through abnormal 
stock performance 9  and operating 
performance changes.10  Secondly, if M&A is 
associated with reduced dividends, does that 
mean that consolidating industries will 
gradually see reduced payouts?  
                                                          
9 Bhagat, S. et al, Journal of Financial Economics, 2005 
10 Heron, R. and Lie, E., Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 2002 
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Conclusions  
e find that acquirers adjust their 
dividend policy towards that of the 
target in the three years post-
merger, but only when they inherit target firm 
shareholders through stock swaps. This is 
after we controlled for various ways in which 
the merger or the payment method choice can 
affect the payout through channels other than 
the clientele effect (e.g., past growth in 
dividends of the two firms, increased 
cashflows due to synergies, liquidity, etc.). 
Specific drivers of increased effects  
We then turned to specific drivers and show 
that the adjustment of the dividend policy of 
the merged firm towards that of the target in 
stock swaps is stronger when dividends are 
more tax-advantaged and when the target firm 
shareholders represent a larger part of the 
combined firm. We also found that dividend 
policy adjustment to that of the target is 
weaker when the bidder comes from a 
superior governance regime. All of these 
effects are consistent with post acquisition 
catering to dividend-seeking shareholders.  
Impact on payment method 
We also examined whether differences in 
dividend policy of the merging firms have an 
influence on the payment method choice. To 
the extent that bidders cannot commit to adjust 
the payout towards the target firm levels, 
larger differences in dividend policy of the 
merging firms have an influence on the 
payment method choice. Similarly, bidders 
may prefer cash payment in order to avoid 
having to make large changes to their dividend 
policy to cater to target firm investors. This is 
exactly what we find. The likelihood of an all-
stock payment, as well as the fraction of the 
consideration in the form of stock, is strongly 
negatively associated with the ratio of target 
firm dividend yield to that of the acquirer. 
Does M&A increase shareholder 
payout? 
Finally, our data allowed us to address another 
interesting question regarding mergers and 
acquisitions and dividend policy. Specifically, 
and abstracting from the dividend clientele 
effect, we studied whether M&A deals in 
general result in increased or decreased 
payout to shareholders. We found that 
mergers are associated with reduced 
combined firm payout: our estimates indicate 
there is a 16% reduction in dividend payout in 
the post-merger years, as compared to control 
sample firms that have not yet merged. 
Moreover, the combined firm is 4% less likely 
to be a dividend-payer than the two stand-
alone firms. Reduced propensity to pay 
following takeovers could suggest that the 
more mature (concentrated) the industry the 
lower the payout. 
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Appendix
We collected a sample of global M&A deals announced between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 
2013 from the Thomson Reuters SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We do not impose any 
geographical restrictions on acquirers or targets in order to increase the size of our sample. (See 
Figure 1 below for the geographical breakdown).  
The final sample of deals consists of transactions that constitute a transfer of control, such that the 
acquirer owns less than 50% of the target before the bid and owns more than 50% of the target upon 
completion. We exclude both acquirer and target companies which operate in regulated industries, 
namely financial services (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4949). The final sample 
consists of 3,458 M&A transactions. 
Variable definitions: 
The change in dividends per share (Δ DPS) is calculated as follows: 
1) Δ DPS is equal to zero when the acquirer distributed equal levels of dividends before and 
after the acquisition (including not paying any dividends before and after) 
2) Δ DPS is equal to one when the acquirer did not distribute dividends before the 
acquisition but initiated dividend payments after the bid. 
3) In all other cases, Δ DPS is equal to the percentage difference between DPS before and 
after the completion of the acquisition. 
Dividend Gap is calculated as follows: 
1) Dividend Gap is equal to 1 when the target and acquirer have the same dividend yield or 
when the acquirer and target both pay zero dividends prior to the acquisition. 
2) Dividend Gap is equal to the value of the 99th percentile of the ratio of target to acquirer 
dividend yields when the target pays dividends before the acquisition and the acquirer 
does not pay dividends before the acquisition. 
3) In all other cases Dividend Gap is calculated as: 
 
Dividend Gap=
Target dividend yield
Y-1
Acquirer dividend yield
Y-1
 
Factors controlled for in the analysis 
1. Signalling theory of dividends 
2. Life cycle view of dividends 
We also include standard control variables. Specifically, we control for the acquiring and target 
companies’ growth rates in dividends during the three-year period prior to the deal. We also control 
for the acquirer and target companies’ growth opportunities, measured as the market-to-book ratio of 
the acquirer and target one year prior to the deal; acquirer and target liquidity, measured as the ratio 
of operating cash flow to sales one year prior to the deal; and acquirer and target maturity, measured 
as the age of the bidder and target one year prior to the deal. We further control for acquirer and 
target profitability, measured as the return on assets one year prior to the deal; acquirer and target 
size, measured as total assets one year prior to the deal; as well as acquirer and target leverage, 
measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets one year prior to the deal. The regressions 
further control for acquirer and target business risk profiles, captured by the standard deviation of 
operating cash flows calculated over a three-year period prior to the deal, acquirer country’s economic 
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growth, measured as the annual growth in GDP. Finally, we control for country, industry and time 
effects. 
Geographic split of transactions 
Figure 1: Acquirer and target countries 
 
Year 
 
Number of Targets 
Number of 
Acquirers 
US 1,672 1,653 
Japan 554 608 
UK 358 383 
Australia 158 135 
France 115 166 
Canada 93 6 
Germany 89 99 
Netherlands 49 70 
Sweden 39 53 
Norway 33 28 
Other 298 257 
Total 3,458 3,458 
 
Source: Cass Business School 
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